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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 




Arnold M. Diamond, Inc. ("Diamond") appeals the District 
Court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Gulf Coast 
Trailing Co. ("Gulf Coast"), Twin City Shipyard, and Collins 
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Electrical, Inc. ("Collins"). The District Court held, among 
other things, that the United States Navy did not assign to 
Diamond its right to sue Gulf Coast for damages arising 
from allisions1 between Gulf Coast ships and a Navy-owned 
pier. We disagree and reverse the District Court's grant of 




Diamond, a privately-owned construction company, 
entered into a contract with the United States Navy to make 
improvements to Pier No. 2 ("the pier") at the Earle Naval 
Weapons Station in Colts Neck, New Jersey. The contract 
provided that Diamond would, among other things, install 
new rubber bumpers and construct new mooring platforms 
to extend the length of the pier. It also provided that the 
Navy would make at least monthly progress payments to 
Diamond and that all work covered by such payments 
would become the "sole property" of the Navy. See JA at 
605-606. These payments, however, did not relieve 
Diamond from repairing work damaged prior to final 
completion and acceptance by the Navy. See JA at 601, 
606. 
 
Gulf Coast, pursuant to a contract with the United States 
Army Corps of Engineers, conducted dredging operations 
around the pier. On March 16, 1986, two dredging ships 
that were owned and operated by Gulf Coast allided with 
the pier, causing damage to the bumpers and the mooring 
platforms. One of the dredges, the Ouachita, was built by 
Twin City Shipyard, which had employed Collins as a 
subcontractor for the wiring of the ship's clutch system. 
 
Following the allisions, the Navy required Diamond, 
under threat of terminating the contract for default, to 
repair the damage caused by the allisions, see JA at 608- 
10, even though the Navy acknowledged that Gulf Coast 
had caused the damage to the pier, see JA at 607-08, 614- 
15, and that Diamond was the appropriate claimant in tort 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. This Court has defined an allision as a collision "between a ship and 
a stationary object." See AT&T v. M/V Cape Fear, 967 F.2d 864, 873 (3d 
Cir. 1992). 
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against Gulf Coast. See JA at 611, 616. Indeed, the Navy 
communicated its position to Gulf Coast via 
correspondence, dated October 28, 1986. See JA at 611. 
Gulf Coast -- presumably in anticipation of Diamond's 
potential lawsuit -- commenced an action for indemnity or 
contribution against Twin City Shipyard and Collins. 
 
Diamond subsequently sued Gulf Coast in the United 
States District Court for the District of New Jersey for 
damages it allegedly sustained as a result of the two 
allisions. The damages alleged included the costs paid by 
Diamond to repair its work in progress and the costs 
associated with the delay in the overall completion of the 
remaining portions of the project. See JA at 599. Gulf 
Coast's indemnity or contribution action was then 
consolidated with Diamond's lawsuit. 
 
In a separate action, Diamond took an appeal to the 
Armed Services Board of Contract Appeals ("ASBCA") 
regarding the Navy's denial of its contract claim for 
additional compensation to cover its repair work. See JA at 
614. Before the ASBCA made its decision, however, 
Diamond and the Navy reached a settlement agreement. 
That settlement agreement contained the following 
assignment clause: 
 
       The Navy has and still contends that Diamond is the 
       appropriate claimant against [Gulf Coast] for all work 
       performed by Diamond which was damaged by [Gulf 
       Coast's] operations. To the extent [Gulf Coast] claims 
       that the Navy is the party to whom it must make 
       payment for damages caused to Diamond, the Navy 
       assigns to Diamond any rights to payment against 
       [Gulf Coast] the Navy had or has for any Diamond 
       costs or damages resulting from the damage caused to 
       Diamond's work in process [sic] by [Gulf Coast's] 
       dredges. 
 
JA at 616. 
 
In the District Court action, Gulf Coast, Twin City 
Shipyard, and Collins filed motions for summary judgment, 
contending that the rule announced by the Supreme Court 
in Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303 
(1927), precluded Diamond from recovering damages from 
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Gulf Coast. The District Court held that the Robins Dry 
Dock rule applied to the facts of this case and granted 
summary judgment in favor of the defendants. In reaching 
its decision, the Court held that the assignment clause in 
the settlement agreement between Diamond and the Navy 
did not transfer to Diamond the Navy's right to sue Gulf 
Coast for damages caused by the allisions. See Arnold M. 
Diamond, Inc. v. Gulf Coast Trailing Co., 979 F. Supp. 301, 
306 n.9 (D.N.J. 1997). The Court reached this conclusion 
for two reasons. First, the Court reasoned that because "the 
Navy ha[d] no right of recovery for Diamond's alleged 
contractual and economic loss, the Navy could not have 
assigned a right to Diamond that it d[id] not have." Arnold 
M. Diamond, 979 F. Supp. at 306 n.9. Second, the Court 
concluded that "Diamond [could] not circumvent the Robins 
Dry Dock doctrine" simply because "the Navy designated it 
as the appropriate claimant against Gulf Coast[.]" Id. 




On appeal, Diamond argues, among other things, that 
the District Court erred in granting summary judgment in 
favor of Gulf Coast on the assignment clause issue. We 
review an order granting summary judgment de novo, and 
we evaluate the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party. Antol v. Perry, 82 F.3d 1291, 1294-95 (3d 
Cir. 1996). When the meaning of contract language is at 
issue, we affirm a grant of summary judgment only if the 
contract language is unambiguous and the moving party is 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See, e.g., Newport 
Assocs. Dev. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co., 162 F.3d 789, 791 
(3d Cir. 1998); Tamarind Resort Assocs. v. Government of 
Virgin Islands, 138 F.3d 107, 111 (3d Cir. 1998). Whether 
a contract is ambiguous is a legal question subject to 
plenary review. Newport Assocs., 162 F.3d at 792; 
Sumitomo Mach. Corp. v. AlliedSignal, Inc., 81 F.3d 328, 
332 (3d Cir. 1996). To affirm a grant of summary judgment 
on an issue of contract interpretation, we must conclude 
that the contractual language is subject to only one 
reasonable interpretation. Tamarind Resort, 138 F.3d at 
110-11; Sumitomo Mach., 81 F.3d at 332; Pennbarr Corp. v. 
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Insurance Co. of N. Am., 976 F.2d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1992). 
The question on appeal, therefore, is whether Diamond has 
provided a reasonable alternative reading of the contract 
under which the defendants would not be entitled to 
judgment as a matter of law. 
 
Diamond contends that "the Navy assigned to Diamond 
`any rights to payment against [Gulf Coast] the Navy had or 
has for any Diamond costs or damages resulting from the 
damage caused to Diamond's work in process [sic] by [Gulf 
Coast's] dredges.' " Appellant's Br. at 20 (quoting JA 616). 
Diamond argues that the "assignment entitled Diamond to 
assert the Navy's rights, as `owner' of the damaged 
property, to recover the repair costs and other damages." 
Id. Applying general principles of contract interpretation,2 
we hold that Diamond's interpretation is, at a minimum, a 
reasonable alternative to that accepted by the District 
Court and that therefore the Court erred in granting 
summary judgment for Gulf Coast. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Neither the District Court nor the parties addressed the issue of the 
body of law to apply in interpreting the assignment clause of the 
settlement agreement. That agreement itself does not contain a choice-of- 
law provision, and the record does not include a complete version of the 
construction contract between the Navy and Diamond, and thus we are 
unable to determine with certainty whether that contract possesses a 
choice-of-law clause. 
 
The Supreme Court has held that "[i]t is customary, where Congress 
has not adopted a different standard, to apply to the construction of 
government contracts the principles of general contract law." Priebe & 
Sons, Inc. v. United States, 332 U.S. 407, 411 (1947) (citing United 
States 
v. Standard Rice Co., 323 U.S. 106, 111 (1944)). See also Boyle v. United 
Techs. Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 504-05 (1988) ("We have held that 
obligations to and rights of the United States under its contracts are 
governed exclusively by federal law."); United States v. Allegheny County, 
Pa., 322 U.S. 174, 183 (1944) ("The validity and construction of 
contracts through which the United States is exercising its constitutional 
functions, their consequences on the rights and obligations of the 
parties, the titles or liens which they create or permit, all present 
questions of federal law not controlled by the law of any state."). 
Because 
the parties in this appeal have not argued that Congress has adopted a 
different standard for contracts between the Navy and independent 
contractors, we will apply "principles of general contract law." 
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Under general principles of contract law, "the purpose of 
interpretation is to become aware of the `intention of the 
parties.' " 3 Arthur L. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, S 538, at 
55 (1960). "[A]n interpretation which gives a reasonable, 
lawful, and effective meaning to all the terms is preferred to 
an interpretation which leaves a part unreasonable, 
unlawful, or of no effect." Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
S 203 (1981). When interpreting a contract, a court may 
consider extrinsic evidence of surrounding circumstances to 
ascertain the intended meaning of the parties. Corbin, 
supra, SS 542, at 100-04, 579, at 414-25; Restatement 
(Second) of Contracts S 214 cmt. b. 
 
In this case, the District Court rejected Diamond's 
interpretation of the assignment clause because the Court 
read this clause as an attempt by the parties to assign a 
"right of recovery for Diamond's alleged contractual and 
economic loss," which, as the District Court also noted, is 
not a right that the Navy possessed. In effect, the District 
Court's interpretation rendered the assignment clause a 
nullity. We hold, however, that the assignment clause may 
reasonably be interpreted as assigning to Diamond the 
Navy's right to payment against Gulf Coast. This right to 
payment includes damages caused by Gulf Coast's dredges 
to Diamond's work in progress. The Navy, as the owner of 
Diamond's work in progress,3 had the right to sue Gulf 
Coast for damages arising from the allisions between Gulf 
Coast's ships and the pier. Thus, this interpretation does 
not assign a right to recovery to Diamond that the Navy did 
not possess and, unlike the District Court's interpretation, 
does not render the clause "unreasonable" or"of no effect." 
Furthermore, in light of the language in the assignment 
clause indicating that the Navy believed that Diamond was 
the appropriate claimant against Gulf Coast,4 as well as 
extrinsic evidence to that effect,5 this interpretation takes 
account of the "intention of the parties." 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. Neither Diamond nor the appellees dispute that the Navy owned the 
damaged improvements to the pier. See Appellant's Br. at 11-12; Gulf 
Coast's Br. at 30; Twin City Shipyard's Br. at 7; Collins's Br. at 7. 
4. "The Navy has and still contends that Diamond is the appropriate 
claimant against [Gulf Coast] for all work performed by Diamond which 
was damaged by [Gulf Coast's] operations." JA 616. 
5. See JA 611 (correspondence from the Navy to counsel for Gulf Coast, 
dated October 28, 1986) ("Diamond is the appropriate claimant against 
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Gulf Coast argues that the assignment clause "has no 
relevance to this dispute." Gulf Coast's Br. at 17. As noted, 
the assignment clause provides in pertinent part:"To the 
extent [Gulf Coast] claims that the Navy is the party to 
whom it must make payment for damages caused to 
Diamond, the Navy assigns to Diamond any rights to 
payment against [Gulf Coast] . . . ." JA 616. Relying on this 
language, Gulf Coast argues that the assignment clause 
was ineffective because Gulf Coast "is not claiming that the 
Navy is the party to whom it must make payment for 
damages allegedly suffered by [Diamond.]" Gulf Coast's Br. 
at 17. See also Twin City Shipyard's Br. at 14-15. We are 
not persuaded that the grant of summary judgment for the 
defendants can be sustained on this ground. 
 
The settlement agreement states that both the Navy and 
Diamond were aware of Diamond's lawsuit against Gulf 
Coast, see JA at 614-15, and, as already noted, that the 
Navy believed that Diamond was the appropriate claimant 
against Gulf Coast. See JA at 616. When the contract is 
interpreted in its entirety, together with the attendant 
circumstances of the parties, the language at issue may 
reasonably be interpreted to mean that the Navy assigned 
to Diamond its right to recovery for damages to the extent 
that Gulf Coast claimed that the Navy, as opposed to 
Diamond, was the appropriate claimant. Although Gulf 
Coast contends that it never claimed that the Navy was the 
party to whom it must make payment for damages arising 
from the allisions, its contention is belied by its argument 
that Robins Dry Dock precludes Diamond from recovering 
damages against it in tort. In making this argument, Gulf 
Coast maintained that the Navy was the owner of 
Diamond's work in progress. See id. at 30-31; see also Twin 
City Shipyard's Br. at 7; Collins's Br. at 11. It is undisputed 
that the Navy, as the owner of the damaged pier, had a 
right to sue in tort for injury to its property and thus was 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
Gulf Coast for all work performed by Diamond which was damaged by 
Gulf Coast's operations."); JA 607 (correspondence from the Navy to 
Diamond, dated May 15, 1986) ("The issue of the damage to your work 
and the subsequent delay is a matter between you and Gulf Coast 
Trailing Company."). 
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an appropriate claimant against Gulf Coast. See Getty Ref. 
& Mktg. Co. v. MT Fadi B, 766 F.2d 829, 833 (3d Cir. 1985) 
(observing that the Robins Dry Dock doctrine would not bar 
a plaintiff from recovering for "negligence that results in 
physical harm to his person or land or chattels" because 
"the physical injury forms the basis of a tort independent of 
any contractual interests and recovery is subject to the 
usual rules governing liability and negligence"). Thus, Gulf 
Coast cannot now maintain that it never claimed that the 
Navy is the party to whom it must make payment for the 
damage its dredges inflicted upon Diamond's work in 
progress. 
 
We now turn to the District Court's second reason for 
rejecting Diamond's argument that the Navy assigned to 
Diamond its right to sue Gulf Coast for the damaged pier, 
viz., the Navy's designation of Diamond as the appropriate 
claimant against Gulf Coast does not permit Diamond to 
circumvent the Robins Dry Dock doctrine. This Court has 
summarized the rule announced by the Supreme Court in 
Robins Dry Dock as follows: "[W]here the negligence does 
not result in physical harm, thereby providing no basis for 
an independent tort, and the plaintiff suffers only pecuniary 
loss, he may not recover for the loss of the financial 
benefits of a contract or prospective trade." Getty Ref., 766 
F.2d at 833. In Robins Dry Dock, time charterers of a 
steamship sued for lost profits when the dock, which was 
performing maintenance on the ship, damaged the ship's 
propeller and caused the ship to be out of service for an 
additional two weeks. 275 U.S. at 307. Under the terms of 
the charter, the ship was to dock every six months, during 
which time the charterers' payments were suspended until 
the ship's servicing was completed. Id. The Court held that 
the charterers had no proprietary interest in the ship and 
that the charterers' loss was due solely to the lost benefit 
of the contract with the owners of the ship. Id . at 308-09. 
To the extent the charterers had any legally protected 
interest in the ship against unintended injuries, the Court 
held that "it must be worked out through their contract 
relations with the owners." Id. at 308. 
 
In this case, the Navy and Diamond may have reached an 
agreement to assign the Navy's rights as owner of the pier 
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to Diamond for the purpose of recovering damages for the 
physical injury caused by Gulf Coast's dredges. If they did, 
Diamond did not -- as the District Court suggested-- 
attempt to "circumvent the Robins Dry Dock  doctrine" by 
enforcing the assignment clause. Rather, in accordance 
with Robins Dry Dock, Diamond sought to protect its right 
of recovery through its contractual relations with the owner 
of the pier. We thus hold that summary judgment should 
not have been granted in favor of the defendants on the 
assignment clause issue.6 Since Diamond did not move for 
summary judgment, we do not reach the question whether 
Diamond would have been entitled to summary judgment. 
 
As a final point, we note that the rights of an assignee 
can rise no higher than those of the assignor. See Corbin, 
supra, S 861, at 421-23; 3 Williston on Contracts, S 404, at 
5 (3d ed. Jaeger ed. 1960). As applied to the instant appeal, 
this means that Diamond is foreclosed from recovering 
damages for economic losses related to the delay in the 
overall completion of the project. Instead, Diamond may 
recover only those damages to which the Navy was entitled, 




For the foregoing reasons, we reverse the District Court's 
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants and 




6. We reject Diamond's alternative argument that Robins Dry Dock was 
not applicable because Diamond allegedly possessed a proprietary 
interest in the pier. Furthermore, we do not reach Diamond's equitable 
subrogation argument, which relies on Amoco Transport Co. v. S/S 
Mason Lykes, 768 F.2d 659, 668-69 (5th Cir. 1985). Diamond did not 
raise this argument below, nor did the District Court address it in its 
opinion. Although Diamond claims that it made this argument in its 
brief opposing Gulf Coast's motion for summary judgment, see 
Appellant's Br. at 2, our review of that brief convinces us that this 
argument was not fairly raised. Accordingly, we hold that Diamond has 
waived its equitable subrogation argument on appeal. See United States 
v. Anthony Dell'Aquilla, Enters. & Subsidiaries, 150 F.3d 329, 334-35 (3d 
Cir. 1998). 
 
                                10 
  
A True Copy: 
Teste: 
 
       Clerk of the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the Third Circuit 
 
                                11 
